Transition Exits: Emigration Dynamics in Latin America’s Emerging Democracies

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Oaxaca in Transition

The Arrival of Electoral Competition in Oaxaca

The graph shows the percent vote for gubernatorial elections from 1980 to 2004. The blue line represents PRI, and the pink line represents PRD. The graph illustrates a decrease in PRI's vote share and an increase in PRD's vote share over the years.
Oaxaca in Transition
Mexico in Transition

- Foley (1999): Contested elections, violent confrontations between partisans of the PRD and the PRI, and military occupation and action to ensure the seating of PRI mayors have marked the state [Guerrero] since 1988, while much of the rest of Mexico moved toward a multiparty democracy.

- Fox (1996): The 1994 presidential elections were in fact “two distinct election-day processes, one ‘modern’ and relatively clean, the other filled with irregularities, including widespread violation of ballot secrecy and direct pressures by local bosses on voters” (Fox 1996, 205).

- SourceMex (1995): One “remarkable aspect” of the Baja California gubernatorial election, won by the National Action Party (PAN) candidate, was “the lack of post-electoral conflict among the various parties . . . due in part to a ‘civility agreement’ reached before the election by the executive committees of the [Institutional Revolutionary Party] PRI and PAN to hold a peaceful and transparent vote.”
The Evolution of Democracy in Latin America
(1972-2007)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Full democracies (%)</th>
<th>Flawed democracies (%)</th>
<th>Hybrid regimes (%)</th>
<th>Authoritarian regimes (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North America (2)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Europe (21)</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Europe (28)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America/ Caribbean (24)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia/Australasia (28)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. East/N. Africa (20)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa (44)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (167)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Latin America in Transition

  - “Provinces peripheral to the national center (which are usually hardest hit by economic crises and are already endowed with weaker bureaucracies) create (or reinforce) systems of local power which tend to reach extremes of violent, personalistic rule open to all sorts of violent and arbitrary practices”

- Fox (1994): “Authoritarian enclaves”

- Zakaria (1997): “Illiberal democracies”

- Smith (2004): As of 1999, 93% of Latin Americans lived in an electoral regime with restricted civil liberties
Corruption Victimization, 2006

Percent of respondents victimized at least once

- Haiti
- Mexico
- Bolivia
- Jamaica
- Ecuador
- Peru
- Guyana
- Paraguay
- Costa Rica
- Guatemala
- Nicaragua
- Dominican Republic
- Honduras
- El Salvador
- Panama
- Colombia
- Chile
- Canada
- U.S.
What is needed in order to avoid excessive emigration . . . . is for a society to provide its members with some “attractions” that will reinforce their normal reluctance to leave. Besides an adequate supply of goods for individual consumption, such attractions can also consist of what is known to economists as “public goods” . . . [such as] guaranteeing human rights and democratic liberties(105).
Political Transitions and Emigration

- Latin American transitions:
  - Uneven, lengthy, performance “issues”
  - Shaped by economic transitions
  - Era of crisis-based development

- Connections to emigration decision
  - Subnational political inequalities
  - Conflict/uncertainty over “rules of the game”
  - Regional variations in political instability
  - Political ceiling on economic opportunity
Exploring the Dynamics of Transition Emigration

- Regime Shocks and Migrant Profiles
  - Peru and Nicaragua (LAMP)

- Uneven Transitions and Migrant Profiles
  - Guerrero, Michoacan, Oaxaca (MMP)

- System Performance in Transition and Thinking about Exit
  - Emigration Intentions across 13 LAC countries (AmericasBarometer survey data)
Peru: Democracy Interrupted

Political Shock in Peru

Polity Score

Nicaragua: Democracy Jumpstart

Democratic Development in Nicaragua

Polity Score

Peru and Nicaragua Political Shocks Compared

- Fujimori Autogolpe in Peru: Neoliberal, anti-terror campaign
  - Expectation: Shift toward lower income, rural, more women

- UNO Electoral Victory in Nicaragua: Reduced threat to private property, structural adjustment
  - Expectation: Rise in economic migrants, decline of political migrants
Peru: Pre- and Post-Autogolpe Migrants Compared

Fujimori’s Autogolpe and First-Trip Migrants

Pre-1992

Post-1992

36.4

52.3

63.6

47.7

Percent of First-Trip Total
Peru: Pre- and Post-Autogolpe Migrants Compared

Fujimori’s Autogolpe and First-Trip Education Profiles

Years of Education Completed

- Primary: 3.1% Before 1992, 0.7% After 1992
- Secondary: 20.6% Before 1992, 31.5% After 1992
- Post-Secondary: 76.3% Before 1992, 67.8% After 1992
Peru: Pre- and Post-Autogolpe Migrants Compared

Fujimori’s Autogolpe and First-Trip Occupation Profiles

Percent of First Trip Total

Before 1992  After 1992

- Professionals/Educators: 25 (13.5%)  27 (33.9%)
- Administrators: 9 (5.4%)  10 (14.9%)
- Agric/Manuf.: 10 (14.9%)  11 (17.1%)
- Unemployed: 21 (31.5%)  27 (39.2%)
- Other: 23 (35.6%)  27 (39.2%)

Legend: Before 1992 - Blue; After 1992 - Red
Nicaragua: Pre- and Post-1990 Migrants Compared

Chamorro Election and First-Trip Education Profiles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years of Education Completed</th>
<th>Before 1990</th>
<th>After 1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>55.5%</td>
<td>55.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Secondary</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percent of First-Trip Total
Nicaragua: Pre- and Post-1990 Migrants Compared

Chamorro Election and First-Trip Occupation Profiles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Percent of First-Trip Totals Before 1990</th>
<th>Percent of First-Trip Totals After 1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professionals/Educators</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agric/Manuf.</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Mexico: The PRD-PRI Conflict and Migrant Profiles

Mexico's Transition Continuum as Measured by Average PRI-PRD Vote Margin, 1992-95

PRI-PRD vote margin in local elections, 92-95
- 0 - 35
- 35 - 50
- 51 - 79
Guerrero and Oaxaca: Two Stages of Transition

Guerrero and Oaxaca Compared

- Guerrero Pre-1989: 75.4%
- Guerrero Post-1989: 57.6%
- Oaxaca Pre-1989: 74.8%
- Oaxaca Post-1989: 68.4%

Male
Female

Percent of First-Trip Total
Guerrero and Oaxaca: Two Stages of Transition

Guerrero and Oaxaca Compared: Education

- Guerrero Pre-1989: 66.8% Primary, 29.3% Secondary, 4.9% Post-Secondary
- Guerrero Post-1989: 51.5% Primary, 42.8% Secondary, 5.7% Post-Secondary
- Oaxaca Pre-1989: 55.5% Primary, 41.3% Secondary, 3.2% Post-Secondary
- Oaxaca Post-1989: 38.9% Primary, 55.4% Secondary, 5.7% Post-Secondary
Michoacan: The Heart of the Conflict

Years of Education Completed

- Pre-1989:
  - Primary: 77.7%
  - Secondary: 18.6%

- 1990-1997:
  - Primary: 54.1%
  - Secondary: 41.6%

- Post-1997:
  - Primary: 67.3%
  - Secondary: 27.7%

Total Percent of First-Trip Total

- Pre-1989: 41.6%
- 1990-1997: 54.1%
- Post-1997: 67.3%
Modeling Intentions to Migrate

**Dependent Variable:** Do you have any intention of going to live or work in another country in the next three years?

- **Socioeconomic / “Friends and Family”:**
  1. Relatives living abroad
  2. Remittances
  3. Personal economic situation
  4. Macroeconomic situation
  5. Salary sufficient

- **Government Performance:**
  1. Government protection of democratic principles
  2. Corruption Victimization Index
  3. Government discrimination
  4. Victim of crime
  5. Feel safe in one’s neighborhood
  6. Satisfaction with municipal services
  7. System Support Index

- **Political Engagement:**
  1. Voting
  2. Political Knowledge Index
  3. Campaign work
  4. Political persuasion

- **Other Controls**
  1. Education
  2. Sex
  3. Age
  4. Children
  5. Income
  6. Marital Status
  7. Urban/Rural
Modeling Intentions to Migrate

**Dependent Variable:** Do you have any intention of going to live or work in another country in the next three years?

![Emigration Intentions in Selected Latin American and Caribbean Countries](image-url)
Modeling Intentions to Migrate

Results:

- **Friends and Family Effect**
  - Respondents with relatives living abroad and those who receive remittances more likely to express intentions to migrate

- **Socioeconomic**
  - Respondents who feel their income is not sufficient to satisfy basic needs more likely to express intentions to migrate.

- **Controls:**
  - Young, single males more likely to express intentions to migrate
Results:

- Political System Performance
  - Respondents who reported direct experiences with corruption, government discrimination, crime, and/or feel unsafe in neighborhood more likely to express intentions to migrate
  - Respondents who perceive their government as defender of democratic principles less likely to express intentions to migrate
  - Political engagement positively related to intentions to migrate
Implications and Future Research

- Political determinants of emigration in era of transitions and flawed democracies
- Political tipping points in neoliberal period?
- Subnational political divides
- El Salvador, Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Brazil
- Open to Suggestions